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ABSTRACT
Instant messaging is a prevalent form of communication ac-
ross the Internet, yet most instant messaging services pro-
vide little security against eavesdroppers or impersonators.
There are a variety of existing systems that aim to solve
this problem, but the one that provides the highest level
of privacy is Oﬀ-the-Record Messaging (OTR), which aims
to give instant messaging conversations the level of privacy
available in a face-to-face conversation. In the most recent
redesign of OTR, as well as increasing the security of the
protocol, one of the goals of the designers was to make OTR
easier to use, without users needing to understand details of
computer security such as keys or ﬁngerprints.
To determine if this design goal has been met, we con-
ducted a user study of the OTR plugin for the Pidgin in-
stant messaging client using the think aloud method. As a
result of this study we have identiﬁed a variety of usability
ﬂaws remaining in the design of OTR. These ﬂaws that we
have discovered have the ability to cause confusion, make
the program unusable, and even decrease the level of secu-
rity to users of OTR. We discuss how these errors can be
repaired, as well as identify an area that requires further
research to improve its usability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There has been much research into creating privacy-en-
hancing technologies, especially since the Internet has started
to play an essential role in everyday life. However, not many
of these technologies have seen widespread adoption. One
of the reasons for this is that many of these technologies
provide insuﬃcient usability [8].
The process of evaluating and enhancing usability is im-
portant in order for a privacy-enhancing technology to pro-
vide beneﬁts to ordinary users. Since privacy is not just
intended for computer scientists or cryptographers, but for
everyone, these technologies should be accessible to the gen-
eral population. However, when people cannot ﬁgure out
how to use those technologies, they may use them incor-
rectly, in which case the technologies may fail to provide the
level of privacy that they are intended to provide, or give up
and decide not to use them at all.
Communication across the Internet has become common-
place using instant messaging, largely for the reason that
instant messaging clients are convenient and very easy to
use. However, most of the instant messaging services are
vulnerable to attacks that can reduce the privacy of the con-
versations using them. In particular, instant messages are
generally relayed through a central server, which provides
a convenient point of access for an attacker. To solve this
problem, there have been a number of privacy-enhancing
technologies developed for instant messaging, though cur-
rently the best solution is Oﬀ-the-Record Messaging (OTR),
as it provides the highest level of privacy. A brief compar-
ison of OTR and other privacy enhancing technologies is
provided in section 2.1.
In the most recent redesign of OTR, one of the goals of
the designers was to make it easier to use for the general
public, in order to avoid the lack of adoption due to poor
usability which has been seen in other privacy-enhancing
technologies. To determine if this design goal has been met,
we conducted a user study of the OTR plugin for the Pidgin
instant messaging client. Our user study aimed to formally
evaluate OTR in order to determine if the design of OTR is
usable, or if usability ﬂaws remain.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section
2 gives the overview of OTR and how it interacts with a
user with emphasis on the authentication process. Section 3
describes the experimental design of the user study, section
4 details the result obtained from the actual experiments,
1sections 5 and 6 discuss the design issues we observed and
some suggested solutions, and section 7 concludes.
2. OFF-THE-RECORD MESSAGING
2.1 Overview of OTR
OTR was introduced by Borisov, Goldberg, and Brewer
in 2004 as a protocol that provides privacy in low-latency
online social communications [3]. The trend was to use IM
for such communications, and so it was ﬁrst implemented
as a plugin for the Linux IM client GAIM (now called Pid-
gin [5]). Currently, OTR is available in many forms. There
is a plugin for Pidgin, and third-party plugins are avail-
able for other IM clients, including Trillian [15] and Kopete
[17]. Adium [19] for Mac OS X and the command-line client
climm [14] (formerly known as mICQ) have OTR built into
them. One can also set up a localhost AIM/ICQ proxy in
order to enable the use of OTR with other IM clients, includ-
ing Apple’s iChat [2]. OTR has been modiﬁed recently by
Alexander and Goldberg [1] in order to enhance its usability.
OTR provides conversations over IM with desired proper-
ties analogous to those of private face-to-face conversations.
OTR encrypts messages in order to make them readable only
to Alice and Bob. Alice is assured that she is talking to Bob
by authentication. Alice is given deniability; that is, no one,
including Bob, can prove the authorship of Alice’s messages
to third parties. Moreover, even if a secret key is stolen,
no past messages will be decrypted, thus providing perfect
forward secrecy [1, 3].
Other privacy-enhancing technologies for IM are available,
but do not have the full features that OTR provides. The IM
client Trillian [15] comes with a built-in encryption system
called SecureIM, but it does not authenticate messages at
all, and so it is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) at-
tacks. The pidgin-encryption plugin [20] does a little better
by giving both encryption and authentication, but perfect
forward secrecy and deniability are not provided.
Another alternative is Secure Internet Live Conferencing
(SILC) [18], which provides all four security features pro-
vided by OTR, but it suﬀers from several drawbacks. One
of the major drawbacks of SILC is that to use it both parties
of the conversation must be using the SILC network; it does
not support any other IM protocols. Also, messages sent
using SILC are shared with the SILC servers, reducing the
amount of privacy provided. SILC does provide a means to
establish encryption private from the SILC servers, but this
may not always be possible, such as in a NAT or ﬁrewall
situation, and may hamper perfect forward secrecy.
If the goal is to allow your IM environment to have the
same level of privacy as oﬀ-line communications, OTR is
currently the best option.
2.2 An Authentication Problem
OTR uses a symmetric-key encryption scheme to encrypt
messages, and a variant [13] of the familiar Diﬃe-Hellman
key exchange protocol [4] for key sharing. In order to pre-
vent MITM attacks, long-lived public/private key pairs are
used to authenticate the initial DH key exchange. All sub-
sequent message authentications are only valid if this initial
key exchange is done properly. If Alice and Bob do not know
each other’s public keys in advance, however, then there is
no way to detect if Eve is impersonating Alice for Bob and
presenting her public key claiming that it is Alice’s. This
Figure 1: The four privacy level indicators
MITM attack will be easy unless some measure is taken.
In fact, a plugin module for the ejabberd IM server [7] has
been written, which will perform this MITM attack auto-
matically.
One solution to this problem is to ask Alice and Bob to
verify each other’s ﬁngerprints (hash values of their public
keys) out-of-band. For example, Alice can make a phone
call to Bob, ask Bob to read his ﬁngerprint oﬀ the screen,
and conﬁrm that it matches the ﬁngerprint displayed on her
screen. Previous implementations of OTR used this method
to authenticate buddies. One problem with this method,
however, is that it is rather cumbersome. Moreover, if Alice
does not know much about security or cryptography, then
this method will only confuse her. If she does not under-
stand what it means to verify Bob’s ﬁngerprint, then she
may blindly accept anybody’s ﬁngerprint. In order for aver-
age users to be able to properly use OTR, a more intuitive
alternative is desirable.
One of the main purposes of the recent redesign of OTR [1]
was to solve this authentication problem. The key idea is
to use information shared by Alice and Bob that is hard for
anyone else to guess; for example, the place where they ﬁrst
met. When Alice and Bob want to authenticate each other,
they both enter the secret into a pop-up window. If they
enter the same value, Alice is convinced that she is talking
to Bob, and vice versa.
The process of buddy authentication described above will
be the main focus of our user study. We would like to know
if average users can properly go through this authentication
process without problems. For the experiment, we decided
to use the OTR 3.1.0 plugin for Pidgin 2.2.1 running on
Windows XP since Windows is the most popular user plat-
form. We will describe below how OTR interacts with a user
under this environment, with an emphasis on the buddy au-
thentication process.
2.3 OTR User Interaction
2.3.1 OTR Button and the Privacy Levels
When Alice enables OTR, the OTR button appears on
the lower left corner of a conversation window with Bob.
The OTR button has three roles.
First, it serves as an icon indicating one of the privacy
levels of the conversation: Not private, unveriﬁed, private,
and ﬁnished (Figure 1). Not private means that the OTR
plugin is enabled but it is not providing any privacy; for
example, because Bob’s IM client does not support OTR.
Unveriﬁed means that the conversation is encrypted, but
Alice has not authenticated Bob; this leaves Alice potentially
vulnerable to MITM attacks. Private means that Alice has
authenticated Bob. Finished means that Alice’s buddy Bob
has ended the private conversation either by closing his IM
client or by choosing the option ‘End private conversation’
(Refer to the last paragraph of this section 2.3.1).
Second, by clicking the OTR button, it starts (when the
2Figure 2: The OTR button in Pidgin. When right-
clicked, a menu with additional options appears, as
shown.
Figure 3: The OTR conﬁguration window
current state is ‘not private’) or refreshes (when ‘unveriﬁed’,
‘private’, or ‘ﬁnished’) a private conversation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, right-clicking the
OTR button gives four additional options to choose from:
‘Start private conversation/Refresh private conversation’ (the
appropriate one of the two options is shown depending on
the current state of OTR), ‘End private conversation’, ‘Au-
thenticate buddy’, and ‘What’s this?’ (Figure 2). The ﬁrst
option ‘Start private conversation/Refresh private conversa-
tion’ has the same eﬀect as left-clicking on the OTR button.
‘End private conversation’ stops encryption and message au-
thentication. ‘Authenticate buddy’ brings up a dialog box
for authentication (Figure 4). ‘What’s this?’ is a link to the
help page ‘Privacy levels’ [11] that explains the four states
of OTR.
2.3.2 Conﬁguration Window
OTR’s conﬁguration window (Figure 3) is available from
the ‘Plugins’ option of Pidgin. Among various options avail-
able, we will only describe those relevant to our user study.
The conﬁguration window has two tabs: ‘Conﬁg’ and ‘Known
ﬁngerprints’.
Under the ‘Conﬁg’ tab, Alice can see her ﬁngerprint, and
can generate her public key/private key pair by clicking the
button ‘Generate’ if she does not have one yet (although
OTR will automatically generate a key for her when needed).
By default, OTR automatically makes conversations private
whenever possible; Alice can also choose not to do so by
unchecking the option ‘Automatically initiate private mes-
saging’.
The second tab, ‘Known ﬁngerprints’, shows all of the
ﬁngerprints that OTR has seen so far, and whether or not
Alice has veriﬁed them. If Alice wishes to authenticate Bob
by verifying his ﬁngerprint manually, she can do so by click-
ing on Bob’s screen name, and clicking the button ‘Verify
ﬁngerprint’, which brings up a ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation win-
dow (Figure 5). More details about ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation
will follow in section 2.3.6.
2.3.3 Help Pages
OTR has three help pages available: ‘Privacy levels’ de-
scribes the four privacy levels illustrated in section 2.3.1,
‘Authentication’ explains how to authenticate buddies us-
ing a shared secret, and ‘Fingerprints’ explains how to au-
thenticate using ﬁngerprints [9, 10, 11]. They are available
through the OTR button, hyperlinks that are embedded in
the messages OTR displays in the conversation window, and
also through the buddy authentication and ﬁngerprint veri-
ﬁcation windows.
2.3.4 Starting a Private Conversation and Authenti-
cation Process
If the ‘Automatically initiate private messaging’ option is
checked (see section 2.3.2), then starting a private conversa-
tion is as simple as sending an initial message using Pidgin.
If not, simply clicking on to the OTR button will initiate a
private conversation.
OTR ﬁrst checks if Alice and Bob have talked with each
other before. If Alice and Bob’s OTR-enabled clients have
seen each other before, then the buddy authentication pro-
cess described below is not necessary since Alice and Bob
use the same public/private authentication key pairs which
were previously veriﬁed, and the conversation is automat-
ically encrypted and authenticated. Otherwise, the OTR
button indicates that the conversation is ‘unveriﬁed’. OTR
also injects messages into Alice’s chat window and tells her
that the conversation is unveriﬁed and she should authen-
ticate Bob. She has an access to the help pages ‘Privacy
levels’ and ‘Authentication’ [9, 11] through the hyperlinks
embedded in the words ‘unveriﬁed’ and ‘authenticate’, re-
spectively.
Alice and Bob can choose one of two ways to authenticate
each other: improved user authentication method using a
shared secret, or by manual ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation. OTR
assumes that most users would prefer to use shared secret
authentication, making shared secrets the default method
of authentication. Fingerprint veriﬁcation is still available
through the ‘Advanced’ button on the buddy authentication
window (section 2.3.6).
2.3.5 Authentication (Shared Secret)
If Alice and Bob want to authenticate each other using a
shared secret, one of them, say Alice, must right-click the
OTR button and select the ‘Authenticate Buddy’ menu op-
tion (Figure 2). This will bring up the dialog box pictured
in Figure 4.
If Alice and Bob had agreed upon which secret to use for
the authentication process, for instance, when they last met
in person, then the next step is to enter the secret value in
the dialog box. Otherwise, they need to ﬁrst decide what the
3Figure 4: The OTR authentication dialog box
secret information will be. They can do so using the unveri-
ﬁed IM, but with care. That is, they must not communicate
the secret value itself. For example, Alice may write, “Let’s
use the name of the restaurant where we ﬁrst met”, but she
should not write, “Let’s use ‘Sea Side OTR’ as our secret”.
Once Alice and Bob know which information to use, who-
ever initiated the buddy authentication process, Alice in our
example, will ﬁrst need to enter the value in the dialog box.
Once Alice hits ‘OK’, the same dialog box will appear on
Bob’s screen. At the same time, Alice will see a message
window called ‘Authenticating Buddy’ with a progress bar
(Figure 9). When Bob enters a secret value and hits ‘OK’,
the same progress bar comes up on Bob’s screen as well.
If Alice and Bob enter the same secret value, then this
completes the buddy authentication process. The ‘Authen-
ticating Buddy’ windows on Alice and Bob’s screen will in-
dicate that the authentication was successful, and the OTR
button will change to read ‘OTR: Private’. If they enter dif-
ferent values, however, the protocol fails and they will have
to redo the process. Alice and Bob learn nothing in this
case other than the fact that they entered diﬀerent values;
this is important so as to prevent a MITM from doing an
oﬄine attack on the secrets entered by Alice and Bob. If the
process keeps failing, then they should be suspicious about
the identities of their correspondents.
2.3.6 Authentication (Fingerprint Veriﬁcation)
Even though OTR has developed a new way to authen-
ticate buddies, Alice and Bob can still choose to manually
verify ﬁngerprints instead of using the new method described
above. To do so, Alice should click on the ‘Advanced’ button
once the buddy authentication window pops up. Alterna-
tively, she can go to the OTR conﬁguration window (section
2.3.2), choose Bob’s screen name under the ‘Known ﬁnger-
prints’ tab, and click on ‘Verify ﬁngerprint’. This will bring
up a ‘Verify ﬁngerprint’ window (Figure 5).
The window shows Alice and Bob’s ﬁngerprints, and asks
Alice to verify Bob’s ﬁngerprint. Clicking on ‘What’s this’
in the bottom of the window gives a brief explanation about
what a ﬁngerprint is, and further clicking onto ‘More’ gives
more detailed description about how to properly authenti-
cate buddies. At the bottom of the explanation, there is
a hyperlink to the OTR help page ‘Fingerprints’ [10] (see
section 2.3.3).
There are several things to note in the ﬁngerprint veri-
ﬁcation process. As brieﬂy mentioned in section 2.2, Alice
should verify Bob’s ﬁngerprint in a secure channel other than
the IM conversation they are using. Also, the ﬁngerprint
Figure 5: Verify ﬁngerprint window
veriﬁcation is one-way; that is, Alice and Bob should each
verify the buddy’s ﬁngerprint if both parties wish to con-
vince themselves that they are speaking to the right person.
This is diﬀerent from shared secret authentication process
which does mutual buddy authentication. Of course, if Bob
does not understand what ﬁngerprints are, he can choose
to do the secret sharing authentication even if Alice has al-
ready veriﬁed Bob’s ﬁngerprint. In fact, Alice and Bob have
the option to authenticate each other as many times as they
choose.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In this and the following section, we will describe the de-
sign and the results of our experiment.
The method we have chosen to test the usability of OTR
is the think aloud method [16], which entails having partici-
pants perform a set of tasks and having them vocalize their
thoughts as they perform these tasks. We chose this method
because it allows us to understand how a user perceives the
system, rather than just observe how the user interacts with
the system. For instance, if a participant performs an action
that causes an error, they would say why they are perform-
ing the action, giving us insight into any misconceptions that
caused that action to be performed.
The assumption of OTR is that two users speaking with
each other have prior knowledge of each other oﬀ of which
they can base some shared secret. It was important for us to
capture this assumption in this study, so that the problems
observed could not be confused with problems introduced
because the two users communicating did not know each
other. To account for this, we decided to recruit four pairs
of friends to participate in this study. We believed that
this would provide a basis for the participants to establish a
shared secret with one another.
One aspect of online messaging that the designers of OTR
do not seem to take into account, however, is that people
communicating online may not have previously been in con-
tact. This can limit the basis on which they can establish
a shared secret. Imagine, for instance, if one user gets an-
other person’s IM address from a message board and wishes
to communicate privately with this person. In this scenario
the two people have some basis to form a shared secret, as
they are both readers of the same message board, but they
do not have any personal knowledge of each other. In this
4Figure 6: The layout of how the users communicated
with each other across the two sessions. P1 and P3 are
friends, P2 and P4 are friends, and so on.
case, the best that can be done is to authenticate the buddy
as “some reader of the message board”.
We wished to include this kind of scenario into our study
in order to determine if there are additional usability issues
inﬂuenced by the degree to which the two users know each
other. To simulate this, in some of our sessions, participants
interacted with their friends, and in other sessions, they in-
teracted with other (non-friend) participants, as indicated
in Figure 6. In this case the participants were all from the
same university, which was a basis for them to determine
a shared secret even though they did not personally know
each other.
Another important aspect of any user interface that we
wished to evaluate was the learnability of that interface. We
assumed that the participants we recruited were unfamiliar
with OTR, and there are bound to be issues when using a
new system. To evaluate how learnable OTR is, we held a
second evaluation session where we asked the users to per-
form the same tasks as in the ﬁrst session. In this session we
evaluated if users were still having trouble using OTR and
repeating errors that they had already experienced.
To stop the participants from simply copying the steps
they performed in the ﬁrst session, including establishing
the same shared secret, we switched who each participant
was talking to (Figure 6). It is important to point out that
in each session we had a group that is talking to their friends,
and a group that is talking to somebody they do not know.
This allowed us to identify any issues caused by users talk-
ing with someone they do not know so that they are not
mistaken as learnability issues in the second session.
Participants were placed in separate rooms with an exper-
imenter in each room to observe the users as well as provide
instruction. After a short explanation of what we wanted
them to do, they were asked to send instant messages to
each other for a short time before enabling the OTR plugin
for Pidgin. The purpose of these tasks were to get them
used to the Pidgin interface, as well as to get them used to
thinking aloud. After they enabled the OTR plugin they
were asked to start and authenticate a private conversation
using OTR, which is the main focus of this study. The last
task we asked the users to perform was to end the private
conversation and then re-establish it.
4. RESULTS
We ran the experiment with four pairs of friends, all stu-
dents of the University of Waterloo. We will call the eight
participants P1 through P8. Five of the eight participants
(P3, P4, P5, P7, and P8) were male, and the remaining
three were female. P5 was a graduate student and all the
remaining were undergraduate students; the ages of the un-
dergraduate participants varied. Four of the participants
were from the Computer Science department, two others
were from other sciences, and two were in the area of arts.
All of the participants said they use IM on a daily basis.
Seven of the participants had never used OTR before, and
one of the participants (P4) had seen OTR before, but had
only used it very brieﬂy.
We will give the results of the ﬁrst sessions (see Figure 6)
in sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4. In the ﬁrst sessions, P1 and
P3, P2 and P4, P5 and P8, and P6 and P7 talked with each
other, respectively, where the ﬁrst two pairs were friends
and the latter two were non-friends. Section 4.5 describes
the second sessions of the experiment.
4.1 Generating a Private Key and Initiating a
Private Conversation
None of the participants had any problems generating pri-
vate keys. Most of the participants had their keys generated
automatically when initiating their ﬁrst unveriﬁed private
conversation, although P5 and P7 manually generated them
in the plugin conﬁguration window. In all cases the private
keys were generated without any issues or confusion as to
what was happening.
Figure 7: Conversation window with OTR messages
Since the default setting was to automatically start pri-
vate conversations, all of the participants were able to be-
gin unveriﬁed private conversations without any apparent
problems, either by sending initial messages, by receiving
messages from their buddies, or by pressing the OTR but-
ton (P6). The OTR button then turned from ‘OTR: Not
private’ to ‘OTR: Unveriﬁed’ as seen in Figure 7.
However, an issue arose when P3 clicked on the OTR but-
ton to start a private conversation before P1 had turned on
the OTR plugin. When this happened P3 was presented
with the dialog message ‘Attempting to start a private con-
versation...’. P1 received a message indicating that P3 was
attempting to start a private conversation using OTR, and
given a link to the OTR homepage, but no indication was
5given to P3 that P1 had not even enabled OTR yet. This
was resolved when P1 enabled OTR and a private conversa-
tion was started.
After unveriﬁed private conversations were started most
of the participants realized that their ‘buddy’ needed to be
authenticated from the dialog given by OTR, seen in Figure
7. The participants P2 and P7, however, did not immedi-
ately recognize that authentication was needed, the reason
for which will be discussed later.
4.2 Starting the Authentication Process
One of the largest diﬃculties that the users encountered
was determining how to start the authentication process in
OTR. As described earlier in section 2.3.5, this process is
started simply by right clicking on the OTR button and
choosing ‘Authenticate buddy’ (Figure 2), but all of the par-
ticipants had considerable diﬃculty ﬁguring this out.
One of the main tools that OTR uses to guide users into
the proper use of the system are help pages that are linked to
from the OTR plugin [9, 10, 11]. The ﬁrst thing that many
of the participants (P1, P3, P6 and P8) did when a dialog
from OTR seen in Figure 7 appeared was to click on the
‘authenticated’ hyperlink, which brought up the authentica-
tion help page [9]. We would like to note, however, that the
‘authenticate’ link did not appear in P2 and P4’s chat win-
dows, and that might have caused some confusion or delay
in the process. P4 later saw the ‘unveriﬁed’ help page and
followed a link from that page to get to the authentication
help page.
Some of those who clicked on the ‘authenticate’ link thought
that it would perform the authentication, and were then
somewhat surprised when a browser popped up bringing
them to the help page. Some of them were even put oﬀ by
the size of the help page, with P3 commenting “Do I have
to read all these?”. Both P1 and P3 only skimmed over the
help page, not reading any of it in much detail, hoping to
quickly ﬁnd out how to authenticate their buddies.
The apparent problem with this help page is that it only
says to“click on ‘Authenticate Connection’ on the OTR but-
ton”in order to start the authentication process, and has no
speciﬁc reference of right-clicking on the button. The par-
ticipants who read this then attempted left-clicking on the
OTR button, in some cases multiple times, expecting it to
solve the authentication problem, which only refreshed the
conversations. P8 initially thought that this had achieved
authentication, but was unsure due to confusion over what
was meant by refreshing the conversation. P5 and P6 were
also confused as to what refreshing the conversation actually
did.
After realizing that clicking on the OTR button was not
accomplishing anything, they started exploring the Pidgin
interface, and looking for more help sources. Three of the
participants (P1, P4 and P5) clicked on the ‘unveriﬁed’ link
(Figure 7) looking for help. However, none of them found
information on this page useful.
Two of the participants, P2 and P7, decided to manually
verify the ﬁngerprints of their buddies (P4 and P6, respec-
tively), and at ﬁrst did not even attempt to initialize the
‘shared secret’ authentication. More about this issue will be
discussed in the following section.
Eventually, some of the participants ﬁgured out to right
click on the OTR button after some eﬀort (P1, P6 and P8),
but P4 needed to be prompted by the experimenter after ﬁve
Figure 8: A part of a help page ‘Oﬀ-the-Record Mes-
saging: Authentication’ describing what not to do
minutes of struggling to ﬁnd the correct action, as neither
he nor his buddy were able to ﬁgure it out within that time.
P2, P3, P5, and P7 did not ﬁnd out the ‘right-click’ on their
own as their buddies initiated authentication, although P3
eventually learned how when P1 explained how it was done
over the IM conversation.
4.3 Authentication
Once the participants ﬁgured out how to start the au-
thentication process, properly establishing a shared secret
was another hurdle that they encountered. One major issue
that occurred, which severely reduces the amount of pri-
vacy that OTR can provide, is that some of the participants
(P1, P4 and P8) explicitly wrote suggested secrets in the IM
window as part of their chat messages. When questioned af-
terward, they said that it was because of the ordering of
the examples in the help page (Figure 8), which shows what
not to do before showing what to do. They said that they
glanced through the help page, saw the example image in
which one person tells the other person what exactly the se-
cret word would be, and just copied it without reading any
of the text around it. While sending the secret, P4 realized
that this did not seem secure, but he nonetheless continued
because he was just following the instructions. P1 initially
tried to describe the secret rather than writing it explicitly.
She changed her mind after failing authentication multiple
times.
A couple of the participants who did not read that section
of the help page (P5 and P6) encountered another problem.
Because they did not read the help page, they did not know
how they were meant to set up shared secrets, so they used
the text box in Figure 4 to enter questions for their buddies
to answer instead of secrets themselves.
Another issue arose with P3, who did not initiate the au-
thentication process. He thought that he had caused the
authentication message box (Figure 4) to appear. Because
of this, he entered a random secret he thought of instead of
the secret suggested by his buddy, which caused the authen-
tication to fail.
As mentioned in the previous section, P2 and P7 authen-
ticated their buddies (P4 and P6, respectively) by ﬁnger-
print veriﬁcation in the OTR conﬁguration window. P2 had
6the conﬁguration window open when she was asked to au-
thenticate her buddy, and decided to verify P4’s ﬁngerprint
because she thought that was what she was supposed to
do to authenticate her buddy. Similarly, while turning on
OTR, P7 decided to look in the plugin conﬁguration, and
then looked at the ‘Known ﬁngerprints’ tab. While in here
he saw that P6 was unveriﬁed, and took this to mean that
messages sent to this participant were insecure, so he clicked
on the ‘Verify Fingerprint’ button, and chose to verify the
ﬁngerprint (Figure 5).
Three problems involving this manual authentication pro-
cess were observed. First, both P2 and P7 ‘veriﬁed’ the ﬁn-
gerprints without bothering to ask their buddies for their
ﬁngerprints in some out-of-band means. P2 knew that it
was an inappropriate way by reading the detailed descrip-
tion about ﬁngerprints given under ‘What’s this?’ in the
‘Verify ﬁngerprint’ window (Figure 5). She justiﬁed her ac-
tion by commenting that she could not think why anyone
would impersonate P4.
Second, this process turned their OTR buttons to ‘OTR:
Private’, and thus P2 and P7 did not initially realize that
their buddies were still having trouble authenticating them.
Further on in the experiment they both realized the error
through communication with their buddies, as both of the
other participant’s OTR buttons were still set to ‘OTR: Un-
veriﬁed’. Once this error was realized P7 began searching
for how to successfully perform the authentication, though
P2 just waited for her buddy to resolve the problem.
Another problem occurred when P7 was being authen-
ticated by P6. P6 initialized the authentication process,
causing the authentication message box to appear for P7.
However, since he had already manually authenticated P6,
the message box told him that the buddy had already been
authenticated. This confused P7, so he clicked on the ‘Ad-
vanced’ button which brought up the message box seen in
Figure 5, which he had already seen and he clicked ‘OK’.
Pressing ‘OK’ did not bring the message box seen in Fig-
ure 4 back up, so P7 assumed that the authentication had
completed. However, P6 had no notiﬁcation of any change
that occurred on P7’s side, and the progress bar remained
at the same position. This caused a considerable amount of
confusion, and it took some time for the two participants to
realize the error.
Even when the participants had realized how to establish
a shared secret, some of the pairs (P1-P3 and P6-P7) still
had problems getting the shared secret right. Even though
they were using secret questions for which they thought the
other person should know the answers, authentication fail-
ures still occurred multiple times. These situations occurred
when the person answering the secret would not know the
correct answer, or would spell it diﬀerently from the other
participant; for example, using capitals where the other par-
ticipant did not.
After the participant who initiated the authentication en-
tered a shared secret, the ‘Authenticating Buddy’ window
(Figure 9) was presented on the initiator’s side. The progress
bar in the window would stop moving, however, until the
other participant also typed in a keyword in the authentica-
tion window and hit ‘OK’. There was no description around
the progress bar as to what exactly was happening. P7 noted
that he assumed it was waiting for the other participant to
answer the question, but that he could not be sure it was
not frozen.
Figure 9: The progress bar shown while a buddy is being
authenticated
4.4 Restarting a Private Conversation
Most of the participants except P3 had no problems when
restarting private conversations with the other participants.
They either sent messages or clicked on the OTR button,
and noticed from the dialog messages given by OTR and
the icon changes in the OTR button, that their conversa-
tions were automatically made private without authentica-
tion. P3 did not realize this ﬁrst, and he initiated authenti-
cation again. The authentication went successfully, however,
using the same secret as the one the pair used in the previous
authentication.
4.5 Learnability Session
The second session (the right column of Figure 6) went
much more smoothly than the ﬁrst, with a very small num-
ber of problems as compared to the ﬁrst session. P5 was the
only participant that struggled to ﬁgure out how to start the
authentication process, since he did not learn how to initiate
authentication in the ﬁrst session. This did not cause much
delay, however, since after a while the participant he was
talking with, P7, started it instead.
Once again, P7 ﬁrst manually authenticated his buddy.
He did this because he had done it in his ﬁrst session, and did
not realize that the ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation was not needed.
He did, however, also initiate the ‘shared secret’ authenti-
cation with P5 since that was what happened in his ﬁrst
session with P6.
There were many fewer problems in setting up a shared
secret. Most of the participants were able to establish a
secure shared secret and authenticate on the ﬁrst try. P4 no
longer sent the secret over IM, and both P4 and P7 described
not only the suggestion for secrets but also the format of the
secrets. The one exception was P3, who sent the secret over
IM. His reasoning though, was that because he did not know
the participant he was speaking with, it was easier to just
send her the secret.
5. DESIGN ISSUES WITH OTR
5.1 Feedback
One of the ﬁrst issues that we observed is the lack of
feedback on whether a buddy’s IM client supports OTR at
all. If a person wishes to set up a private conversation using
OTR with a buddy and that buddy does not have OTR
installed, it will display a message to the buddy informing
them of the request, but no feedback is given to the person
initiating the request. This is a relatively minor point, as
a simple exchange between the two buddies can reveal that
one of them does not have OTR installed; however, there is
7still a possibility of confusion or frustration to the initiator
as to why OTR is not working.
The messages that OTR injects into the conversation win-
dow, seen in Figure 7, are used as a tool to notify users that
further authentication is needed. Although this feedback
was successful in making the users realize that they needed
to somehow authenticate their buddy, there was some uncer-
tainty in the participants as to what the ‘authenticate’ and
‘unveriﬁed’ links were for. Some of the participants thought
that clicking on them would perform the authentication, and
were surprised when it brought up a help page. This confu-
sion could be avoided by rewording the message to make it
more clear that the ‘authenticate’ link leads to a help page.
Another problem that we observed was the lack of feed-
back given in the progress bar (Figure 9). Although no
direct problems were caused by it, it was noted by a par-
ticipant that he had to assume what was happening when
the progress bar had stopped moving. This lack of feed-
back could cause confusion, possibly causing a user to think
that the process had frozen. This can be solved by adding
messages to the progress bar’s message box indicating the
state of the authentication process, particularly that it was
waiting for the buddy to enter his secret.
5.2 Manual Veriﬁcation
Another issue concerning feedback was encountered dur-
ing the experiments when P7 manually veriﬁed his buddy.
Because there was no feedback to him that manually veri-
fying his buddy did not do mutual veriﬁcation, he became
confused when his buddy later initiated the authentication
process. Such confusion could be avoided simply by adding a
message box when a user manually veriﬁes a buddy warning
that his buddy still needs to authenticate him.
Beyond simple feedback issues, the ability to manually au-
thenticate a user caused other signiﬁcant problems. Having
the ability to manually authenticate a buddy makes sense for
users with a more advanced knowledge of computer privacy
who may feel more comfortable conﬁrming a buddy’s ﬁnger-
print out of band. However, an average user may not realize
that this is how manual veriﬁcation is meant to be done, as
was seen with P2 and P7. OTR does have an explanation of
how the manual veriﬁcation should be performed, but to see
it they need to click on the ‘What’s this?’ expansion, seen
in Figure 5, and then click on an additional ‘More’ expan-
sion. This message box should be changed to clearly warn
of the privacy implications of manually verifying a buddy
as opposed to using the shared-secret method. Further, in
order to protect an average user who may accidentally open
the ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation window, it should clearly indicate
that there is a more intuitive alternative available. On the
contrary, however, the ‘What’s this?’ expansion on the ﬁn-
gerprint veriﬁcation window says ‘A ﬁngerprint is a unique
identiﬁer that you should use to authenticate your buddy’.
The misleading word ‘should’ may make a user think that
the ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation is the only way to authenticate
his buddy.
One other issue with manual veriﬁcation was seen with P7
when his buddy initiated the ‘shared secret’ authentication.
Presented with the authentication dialog box, P7 clicked on
the ‘Advanced’ button and went through the manual veri-
ﬁcation message box again. This caused a lot of confusion
between P7 and the buddy he was talking with, since there
was no indication to the buddy about what P7 had done,
even to the point that the progress bar stayed on her screen
unmoving, as well as there being no indication to P7 that
the ﬁngerprint veriﬁcation did not complete the authenti-
cation process that his buddy requested. This ‘Advanced’
button should be removed altogether from the authentica-
tion message box of the buddy being challenged with the
authentication, as it does nothing toward responding to that
challenge.
5.3 Help Page
We observed several issues in the help page for OTR au-
thentication that resulted in problems for some of the par-
ticipants. One was in the presentation of the instructions
on the page. For example, we observed some users looking
at the images on the help page depicting how to set up a
shared secret and imitating what they saw. However, since
the image of what not to do was shown ﬁrst, many of the
participants set up their shared secrets incorrectly, under-
mining the level of privacy that OTR oﬀers. This problem
can be solved by showing the image of the correct procedure
ﬁrst, and making it more visually clear that the other ex-
ample is the incorrect method, possibly by putting an ‘X’
through the image.
More generally, we found in the experiment that most of
the participants would not read the instructions on the help
pages in detail, and would instead just skim them, look-
ing mostly at the pictures in the instructions to get an idea
of what to do. This could be taken advantage of by lay-
ing out more of the instructions in a pictorial format, as it
would aid users in quickly understanding the content of the
instructions without needing to read them.
Another issue we observed with the help page for authen-
tication was that it did not provide adequate information
to properly initiate the authentication process. Although
it does tell users to click on the OTR button, it makes no
mention of right-clicking on the button. This caused consid-
erable frustration, and more precise instructions need to be
given in order to provide users with all the tools necessary
to use the system properly.
5.4 OTR Button
The main reason that none of the users thought to right-
click on the OTR button, besides the lack of instruction in
the help page, is due to the aﬀordances inherent in buttons.
The OTR button has two actions that can be performed on
it: pushing it (left-clicking) and right-clicking it, but buttons
are only naturally associated with the aﬀordance of push-
ing [6]. This is the likely reason that the participants had
so much trouble realizing that right-clicking was the correct
action to perform. Because there are multiple actions that
need to be performed using the OTR button, showing the
menu when the button is pressed would probably cause less
confusion to users. The tooltip of the OTR button should
also indicate that there are multiple actions that can be per-
formed with the button, and how to access them.
Another confusion when initiating authentication occurred
when participants left-clicked the OTR button and the OTR
refreshed the conversations. There should be description in
the OTR dialog or a help page explaining what refreshing
conversation means. Otherwise, puzzled by the unfamiliar
term, some may assume that the authentication has been
properly carried out.
85.5 Authentication
We observed a lot of diﬃculty that the participants had in
completing the authentication procedure once they learned
how to start it. As discussed earlier, the ordering of the
instructions in the help page caused confusion in how to
establish a shared secret to use, which caused some partici-
pants to set up a shared secret improperly. Others thought
the text box to enter the shared secret (Figure 4) was meant
to be used to enter a question to base the secret on, caus-
ing the authentication to fail. One of the participants was
unaware that the buddy he was talking to had initiated the
authentication. He thus thought he had caused the authen-
tication window to come up, which lead him to use it to
enter his own shared secret, causing the authentication to
fail. Also, there is no clear indication in OTR as to how to
set up a shared secret without referring to the help page for
instruction.
We believe that all of these issues could be solved by re-
designing the authentication window (Figure 4) so that it
allows not only a ﬁeld to enter a secret but also a ﬁeld for the
user initiating the authentication to enter a question that the
shared secret answers. The buddy would then see a message
box containing the question that the initial user entered,
as well as a space to enter the shared secret. Redesigning
the authentication process in this manner should guide users
into the proper use of the system without the need of addi-
tional help material. Separate areas for a question and an
answer should make it clear that the shared secret (answer)
should be separate from the question, greatly increasing the
level of privacy given by the system. Additionally, since
the buddy being sent the authentication request will see a
message box that is diﬀerent from the challenger’s, with a
question to be answered, there should not be confusion as
to who initiated it, or what to do with it.
One point to note is that this proposed method of au-
thentication is only one-way; that is, only one user initiates
the authentication and the other responds. As mentioned in
[1], for this question-and-answer style of secret sharing to be
completely secure it must be performed in both directions
(once by each user), and users must be made aware of this
fact.
6. DISCUSSION
One factor we wished to address was the learnability of the
OTR interface. We have seen that once users have ﬁgured
out how to use OTR the ﬁrst time they did not have any
trouble using it a second time. However, this does not mean
that the usability issues we have noted in the ﬁrst sessions of
our experiments are less urgent. If a user learns the incorrect
way of using the application, they will continue to use it
incorrectly, as was seen with P7 when he used the manual
authentication in the second session. This could have serious
negative consequences in the level of privacy that OTR can
provide to that user. Also, if a user has problems with a
program the ﬁrst time they use it, they are less likely to
continue using it.
Another idea we wished to study, as we noted earlier, is
how the secret sharing process changes when a participant
is talking with a friend as opposed to a non-friend. We saw,
as would be expected, that on average people who knew
each other had an easier time establishing a shared secret
than those who did not. Although this was the case, the
people who did not know each other personally were able
to establish a shared secret based on knowledge they knew
they would have in common, such as “What is the name of
the university we attend?”. This demonstrates that OTR
can have a wider audience than people who know each other
personally, such as purely on-line friends. When questioning
the participants after the experiment, P4 noted that he in
fact had friends that he only knew on-line.
One of the informal assumptions that OTR relies on is
that users know each other oﬀ-line and are able to establish a
shared secret through some oﬀ-line channel or shared knowl-
edge. However, this may not always be true, and needs to be
taken into account when considering the problem of having
users establish a shared secret to authenticate each other.
This problem extends beyond the use of OTR, as shared
secret authentication is used in other applications, such as
Interac’s email money transfer [12], which uses shared secret
authentication to authenticate recipients of a fund transfer.
The secret sharing method of authentication is a good idea
in concept, but we have seen that there are some barriers
to overcome that might deter users from the use of OTR.
Some of the participants stated after the experiments that
the diﬃculty they encountered establishing a shared secret
as a reason for not wanting to use OTR in the future, even
though they saw some potential use in the security it pro-
vides. Further research needs to be done on how to guide
users toward establishing shared secrets that are secure and
that both parties can answer. “What is the name of the
university we attend?” is a question that both users can an-
swer, but it is not very secure, as a number of people could
easily ﬁnd the answer to that question.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In redesigning Oﬀ-the-Record Messaging, one of the in-
tents of the designers was to make OTR easier to use for a
larger user base. However, even in a relatively small user
study of only 8 students, most of whom had some techni-
cal experience with computers, each one of them had some
sort of problem when trying to use OTR. As a result of this
user study, we have discovered several usability ﬂaws in the
design of the OTR plugin for Pidgin. Many of the ﬂaws
identiﬁed are minor and are not likely to result in too much
trouble for a user, but some are much more severe, and could
cause the system to be used in an unintended manner, de-
creasing the level of privacy that OTR can provide, or even
stopping a user from being able to use the system.
Although our suggestions for improvements should resolve
most of the issues that we observed, users may still have
problems creating secure shared secrets that both parties
can answer. We believe that our suggested improvement of
the authentication message box will successfully guide users
toward creating a shared secret; however, it may not help
guide them toward creating a good shared secret. Future
work needs to be done to investigate methods of helping
users to create secure shared secrets.
Throughout this paper, we have discussed changes in the
design of the OTR plugin for Pidgin that we believe will
ameliorate the usability issues observed. At the time of the
writing, a group at the University of Waterloo is implement-
ing the suggestions that we have made, and we hope to re-
peat this study when the modiﬁcations are complete.
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